










John	 Raymond	 Smythies	 (b.	 1922)	 is	 a	 neuroscientist	 and	 philosopher	 of	mind,	 cousin	 to	
Richard	Dawkins	and	Graham	Greene.	The	following	is	a	summary	of	his	ideas	on	phenomenal	





o [This	 is	 in	 contradistinction	 to	 the	 common	 Cartesian	 belief	 that	 the	








– Smythies	 writes	 that	 visual	 sensations	 [such	 as	 imagining	 two	 triangles	
simultaneously]	are	spatial	considering	the	fact	that	they	have	spatial	properties	and	
relations	–	thus	(non-exhaustively):	
o Sensations/sense-data	 ‘may	 be	 inside	 or	 outside	 other	 sense-data	 in	 a	
topological	sense	…	.	In	general	sense-data	may	satisfy	many	of	the	axioms	and	
theorems	of	topology.’	(p.	10)	



























i.		 Identity	of	a	and	b	 	 	 (a=b)	
ii.		 a	as	a	proper	subset	of	b	 	 (b	(a)		)	
iii.		 b	as	a	proper	subset	of	a	 	 (a	(b)		)	












§ [Smythies	 promotes	 a	 representationalist	 theory	 of	 perception,	 but	
that	is,	in	my	view,	ultimately	irrelevant	to	his	views	on	spatiality.]	




of	p).	He	writes	that	this	 ‘is	 the	theory	of	psycho-neural	 identity	theory	which	has	
been	largely	abandoned	by	neorologists’	(p.	16).	




strictly)	 is	 its	 ‘correlated’	brain	process.	 That	 the	 two	 terms	have	 the	 same	
referent,	as	do	the	‘morning	star’	and	‘evening	star’	(i.e.	Venus).]	
o [It	may	 be	wondered	why	 Smythies	 considers	 PN-IdT	 as	 relation	 3	 (subset)	
rather	 than	 relation	 1	 (identity),	 considering	 its	 name	 and	 purport.	 But	









identical	 unless	 they	 are	 geometrically	 congruent.	 …	 [E]vents	 in	 the	
cerebral	 cortex	 …	 concerned	 in	 a	 particular	 perception	 are	
geometrically	non-congruent	with	the	sense-data	that	these	events	are	














































• In	 a	 footnote	 here	 (p.	 25)	 Smythies	 acknowledges	 the	
disputability	 of	 assuming	 that	 only	 one	 temporal	 dimension	
could	be	common	to	all	phenomenal	spaces	–	it	is	‘beyond	the	
scope	of	 this	book’.	 In	other	words,	 it	 could	be	 the	case	 that	
separate	 phenomenal	 spaces	 have	 temporal	 dimensions	
incongruent	with	other	phenomenal	and	physical	spaces.	[This	
















§ [Note	 that	 it	 is	 assumed	 here	 the	 phenomenal	 space	 is	 three-
































o ‘A	 mind	 is	 a	 complex	 composite	 of	 sense-data	 organised	 into	 sense-fields,	
together	with	images,	thoughts,	affects	and	perhaps	a	Pure	Ego.’	(p.	28)	
§ He	 then	 adds	 that	 the	 ‘mind	 thus	 defined	 is	 a	 part	 of	 the	 total	
organism—an	extra	part	which	we	have	previously	failed	to	recognise	
because	of	its	particular	geographical	location	and	because	some	of	its	
constituent	 parts	 (sense-data)	 have	 been	 confused	 with	 physical	
objects’	(p.	28).	
• That	is	to	say	that	because	an	organism	fundamentally	includes	
its	 mind,	 an	 organism	 is	 a	 higher-dimensional	 entity	 in	 its	
totality,	 such	 that	 a	 four-dimensional	 description	 of	 the	
organism	cannot	be	sufficient.	
• ‘There	 are	 also	 higher-dimensional	 geometries	 available	 to	





o [Smythies	 mentions	 the	 mescaline	 experience	 in	 this	
book	(p.	47	–	but	only	in	respect	to	H.	H.	Price’s	version	
of	 Theory	 I).	 But	 I	 refer	 interested	 readers	 again	 to	
Smythies’	 1953	paper	 (which	 inspired	Aldous	Huxley’s	
The	 Doors	 of	 Perception	 [1954]),	 ‘The	 Mescaline	
Phenomena’.]	
	
– Smythies	 argues	 that	 both	 these	 theories	 are	 compatible	 with	 psycho-neural	

















• It	 is	 thus	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 Smythies	 rejects	 both	 the	









– Smythies	 refers	 to	 E.	 A.	 Abbott’s	 classic	 novel	 Flatland	 (1926)	 –	 where	 the	 two-
dimensional	 polygon	 people	 cannot	 sufficiently	 perceive	 nor	 imagine	 a	 three-
dimensional	world	–	 	when	Smythies	writes	 ‘there	 is	no	a	priori	 reason	why	 there	
should	not	be	higher-dimensional	spatial	relations	between	sense-data	…	on	the	one	
hand	and	physical	objects	on	the	other.’	(p.	48)	
o Smythies	 points	 to	 Bertrand	 Russell	 on	 this	 possibility,	 specifically	 his	 texts	













– Smythies	 illustrates	 metaphorically	 the	 ‘psychophysical	 geometry’	 of	 Theory	 II	 n-
dimensionality	(in	the	Appendix	II,	p.	127)	by	means	of	a	4D	tesseract:	the	inner	cube	
represents	physical	space	and	six	contiguous	flat-top	pyramids	(which	are	additional	












o [That	 ‘angle	 ABC	 will	 always	 be	 a	 right	 angle’	 (p.	 54)	 in	 Theory	 II	 is	 not	












§ interaction	 2	 –	 mind-to-matter	 (mental	 causation	 [inc.	 free	 will],	 in	
most	emergentism,	dualism,	idealism	[as	projection],	etc.)]	
o Theory	 I:	 non-spatial	 causal	 processes	 ‘crossing	 the	 unimaginable	 void	
between	 the	 public	 physical	 spatial	 system	 and	 each	 private	 experiential	
spatial	system’	(p.	55).	
§ [such	causal	processes	would	 include	 those	hypothesized	 to	exist	by	
the	 transordinal	 nomologies/psychophysical	 bridge	 laws	 of	 the	
emergentists	[e.g.	J.	S.	Mill,	C.D.	Broad].	That	such	laws	are	not	laws	of	
physics	 is	 one	 reason	 for	 the	 rejection	 of	 emergentism	 as	 an	
unscientific	theory	(e.g.	by	J.	J.	C.	Smart	[1959]).]	







possibility	 that	 the	phenomenal	 spatial	 field	at	any	specious	present	
transcends	that	which	is	actually	sensed.		
• ‘Each	 private	 sensed	 spatial	 system	 may	 thus	 be	 set	 in	 or	





dream	space,	 it	would	mean	 that	 the	dream	world	extended	
beyond	 that	which	 one	 actually	 experienced	 in	 one’s	 dream:	
the	dream	would	be	larger	than	your	experience	of	it.]	
• Further	still,	Smythies	speculates	that	a	‘psychical	mechanism’	











o Smythies	 speculates	 that	 there	 could	 be	
transdimensional	 processes	 [i.e.	 only	 appearing	
systematic	from	a	transdimensional	perspective].	
§ [Just	 as	 3D	 processes	 would	 appear	
unsystematic,	 irregular,	 and	 largely	 obscured	
when	interfacing	a	2D	Flatland.]	
o ‘Normally	 the	 only	 transdimensional	 processes	 are	
conducted	by	ψy	[connections	of	sensory	areas	of	brain	
to	 the	 sense	 fields	 of	 experience]	 and	 ψx	 [process	







§ [i.e.	 via	 the	 (for	 us)	 unsensed	 dimensional	













a	 single	 (3m	 +	 3)	 dimensional	 one	 rather	 than	 multifarious	
separate	3D	universes.	
• Theory	 II	 B	 would	 have	 to	 stipulate	 ‘a	 non-spatial	 part	
connecting	two	spatial	parts:	the	brain	and	the	sensory	fields’	
(p.	58)	








– Smythies	 concludes	 by	 listing	 how	 these	 theories	 are	 advantageous	 to	 Cartesian	
dualism.	
o Such	dualism	cannot	give	an	 intelligible	account	of	the	 interaction	between	
sense-data	and	the	brain.	
o Theories	 I	 &	 II	 both	 view	 an	 organism	 as	 a	unitary	 mind-body	 entity,	 that	
cannot	be	parsed.	In	dualism	the	mind	(soul)	can	live	on	after	the	(3D)	body	
dies.	
o ‘The	 Cartesian	 dualism	 is	 a	 dualism	 of	 substance	 whereas	 the	 theories	
presented	here	are	dualisms	of	spatial	 location.	They	are	however	monistic	
theories	in	the	logical	field	of	causal	relation	and	organisation.’	(p.	59)	










§ This	 is	 because	 the	 three-dimensional	 space	 of	 the	 brain	 is	 not	 the	
totality	of	the	space	of	reality,	and	is	not	a	more	fundamental	ontology:	
• ‘it	may	 be	 that	 an	 accurate	 and	 comprehensive	 neurological	
account	 of	 perception	 cannot	 be	 given	 solely	 in	 terms	 of	
physical	 objects	 including	 brains	 and	 the	 language	 system	of	










Perhaps	 in	 the	 dim	 future	 mankind,	 if	 it	 then	 exists,	 will	 look	 back	 to	 the	 queer,	
contracted	 three-dimensional	 universe	 from	which	 the	 nobler,	 wider	 existence	 has	
emerged.’		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
											(Modes	of	Thought)	
	
–	–	–	
